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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of the use of the informal recruitment channel (relatives 
and friends) on the probability of being overeducated in the Italian labour market. We argue 
that the informal recruitment channel may increase job-education mis-matches both directly 
(by inducing some workers to undertake careers in industries, professions, or firms where 
their comparative productive advantage is not fully exploited) and indirectly by negatively 
affecting spatial flexibility. In order to test these hypotheses, we estimate probit models with 
self-selection using ISFOL PLUS survey data providing information on labour market entry 
channels, job related migration and a “subjective” measure of overeducation. We find a 
robust positive impact of the use of the informal channel on overeducation and a robust 
negative effect of the use of this channel on migration. On the other hand, we find that 
migration reduces overeducation only when focusing on private employment or on some 
geographical areas of the Italian territory. Overall, these findings suggest that a reform of 
employment services in Italy is needed in order to favour spatial flexibility, reduce the use 
of the informal channel and enhance the quality of job-education matches.  
 
JEL Classification: R23, J24; J61 
Key words: overeducation, informal recruitment channel, migration, spatial flexibility in 
labour market 
 
1. Introduction 
Imperfect information leads to various forms of mismatches in the labour market. One of 
such mismatches is the phenomenon of overeducation denoting a situation in which 
workers’ schooling levels are not necessary for carrying out their jobs. Education-job 
mismatches have negative consequences for individuals and firms since they lead to lower 
income levels, higher dissatisfaction, lower productivity and higher turnover. Understanding 
the determinants of skills underutilisation is, therefore, important for enhancing human 
capital investment, bringing better competencies into the labour market and increasing living 
standards. 
 
Italy is one of the industrialised countries with the lowest percentage of graduates
1
. 
Nevertheless, in 2011, 18.2% of graduates declared that their schooling level was not 
required for their job. Such percentage was 36.9% for people with a secondary degree. 
These figures show the presence of the paradoxical phenomenon called “overeducation” in a 
country that relatively under-invests in high education. The Italian labour market is also 
characterised by strong differences in the distribution and in the quality of jobs over the 
territory. In 2011, the unemployment rate was 5.8 in the North, 7.6 in the Centre and 13.6 in 
the South. In this context of strong spatial imbalances and strong differences in the 
productive structure across the territory, inter-regional mobility might play a relevant role 
for overcoming the mismatch between the demand and supply of skills. 
 
Recently few studies have investigated this issue finding different results. Croce and 
Ghignoni (2011) show that for workers holding an upper secondary degree the risk of 
overeducation decreases with commuting time, while among the university graduates 
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in Italy (21.7%), followed by Romania (21.8%) and Malta (22.4%). 
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migration reduces overeducation. This second result is questioned by Devillanova (2013), 
showing that when the characteristics of the job (or the endogeneity of migration) are 
controlled for, migration displays no effect (or a positive effect) on overeducation. Finally, 
Iammarino and Marinelli (2012) find that migration reduces overeducation only in the 
Northern Regions where the most dynamic economic and innovation systems are located.  
 
All these studies neglect the possible role of labour market entry channels in affecting 
migration decisions and overeducation. In Italy, workers find a job mainly through informal 
channel (family and friends referrals)
2
. While, in principle, social ties can be an effective 
mechanism to overcome information asymmetries, thus allowing for a better matching 
between employers and employees, most empirical studies on Italian data have found that 
the use of the personal channel is associated to lower wages (Pistaferri; 1999; Pellizzari; 
2004; SylosLabini, 2004; Meliciani and Radicchia, 2011) and a higher probability of 
overeducation (Meliciani and Radicchia, 2011). However, these studies have neglected the 
possible indirect effects of the informal recruitment channel on education-job mismatches 
through their likely impact on spatial flexibility. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap 
by linking the choice of the recruitment channel to migration decisions and to the 
phenomenon of overeducation. In particular, we estimate probit models with self-selection 
using ISFOL survey data providing information on labour market entry channels, job related 
migration and a “subjective” measure of overeducation.  
 
Our main hypothesis is that the use of family and friends referrals limits the extent of job 
search to the local labour market, thus reducing spatial flexibility and increasing the risk of 
education-job mismatches. The existence of such an effect would have important 
consequences on the design of effective policies devoted to reduce skills imbalances, 
suggesting that this outcome may be achieved not only by improving vocational education 
and training systems but also by better organising employment services with the purpose of 
enhancing mobility. 
 
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses two stands of 
literature that have not communicated so far, i.e. that on spatial mobility and overeducation 
and that on recruitment channels and job mismatches, and introduces our main research 
hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology. Section 4 presents the results of 
the empirical analysis. Finally, Section 5 draws the main conclusions and policy 
implications.  
 
2. Review of the literature and research hypotheses 
In this Section we will briefly review two stands of literature that have not communicated so 
far: that on the relationship between spatial mobility and overeducation and that on the link 
between the informal recruitment channel and employer-employees mismatches. We will 
then try to link the main findings of these lines of investigation to introduce our main 
research hypotheses. 
 
2.1 Spatial flexibility and overeducation 
In the economic literature the relevance of the spatial dimension on overducation has been 
studied separately, in relationship with international migration and internal mobility 
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(commuting and/or migration across local labour markets)3. The results of these two streams 
of literature differ in terms of the impact of migration on overeducation. In particular, while 
in the international migration literature several studies establish that migrants are 
characterized by a higher probability of being overeducated relative to the native population 
in the country of destination, the link between internal migration and overeducation remains 
uncertain. Some studies, such as Büchel and Battu (2003) or Büchel and Van Ham (2003) 
have highlighted the role of regional labour market as a potential explanatory variable of 
overeducation. The central aspect of the analysis of Büchel and van Ham (2003) consists in 
analysing which is the role of job opportunities in local labour markets (unemployment 
rates) and commuting (availability of private transport and commuting time) to explain the 
probability of being overeducated. In specific, they develop a theoretical framework relating 
the existence of overeducation at the individual level with the availability of job 
opportunities: an individual searching for job in a given local labour market has three 
options when in this market there is no appropriate job for him/her. The first option is not to 
accept the job and continue the search (unemployment); the second option consists in 
accepting a job in this local labour market but with lower educational requirements than the 
ones he/she has (overeducation); and, the third option consists in accepting a job in a 
different local labour market, probably assuming a commuting distance higher than desired. 
Their results show that the possibility of acceding to wider geographical areas when 
searching for job decreases the probability of being overeducated. Similarly Hensen et al. 
(2009) find – for Dutch graduates – that those who are geographically mobile have a higher 
probability of finding jobs suitable for the acquired educational level as well as permanent 
or full time jobs. In fact, they analysed separately five education-job mismatches: jobs (i) at 
or below the acquired education level; (ii) within or outside the study field; (iii) with 
permanent or flexible contracts; (iv) with full- or part-time contracts; and (v) paid below or 
above the average wage controlled for the previous mismatches. The measure of spatial 
flexibility is the Euclidean distance between the municipal location of education (implicitly 
assumed as the residential place) and the location of the current job, 18 month after 
graduation. Jauhiainen (2011) examined the effect of location on overeducation
4
 from 
Finnish census data, also in a gender perspective. He finds that the probability of being 
overeducated decreases in a large labour market (metropolitan area, university city, or 
regional centre) and only for long distance (or interregional) migration5. But the marginal 
effect reveals some gender differences: the probability of women being overeducated varies 
less between regional categories than it does for men. He explains this aspect with the 
problem of gender segregation in the labour market in Finland. Women work frequently in 
the service sector or in the public sector that are spatially less concentrated than jobs in the 
private sector. In Italy, only recently there have been some studies analysing the relevance of 
spatial flexibility in the local labour market on the individual risk of being overeducated. 
Croce and Ghignoni (2011), using the same data of the present paper (but the Isfol Plus 2005 
cross section) find that, on the overall sample, both variables measuring spatial mobility 
(commuting time and migration) have a negative and significant coefficient in the  
overeducation equation, while the distinct regressions for upper-secondary and tertiary 
graduates show mixed results: the risk of overeducation decreases only with commuting 
time for upper-secondary graduated, while having moved for working reasons affects the 
quality of your match only among the university graduates. This second result is questioned 
by Devillanova (2013) showing that when the characteristics of the job are controlled for, 
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 Overeducated individuals are identified with a statistical measurement method. 
5
 Even if short-distance migration seems to increase the probability of being overeducated. 
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migration displays no effect (or a positive effect) on overeducation
6
. On the contrary, the 
effect of commuting is statistically significant and robust across different specification, 
although quantitatively low. Finally, Iammarino and Marinelli (2012), focussing on the 
impact of interregional migration on job mis-matching of the graduate’s professional 
career
7
, find that migration reduces overeducation only in the North Italy where the most 
dynamic regional economic and innovation systems are located.  
 
2.2 The informal recruitment channel and employer-employees (mis)matches 
 
Social ties can be an effective mechanism to overcome problems of asymmetric information 
between employers and employees in the labour market, thus allowing for a better matching. 
However, empirical studies investigating the impact of the informal recruitment channel (in 
particular, relative and friends) on workers’ remuneration and on other measures of workers’ 
satisfaction have found contrasting results.  
 
Most of the literature focussing on the Unites States has shown the higher wages, higher 
productivity, lower turnover and higher tenure of referred workers (Cocoran et al., 1980; 
Datcher, 1983; Simon and Warner, 1992; Korenman and Turner, 1994; Holzer, 1997; 
Rosenbaum et al. 1999; Marmaros and Sacerdote, 2002). Recently, however, a few studies 
conducted mainly in Europe (Pistaferri, 1999; Addison and Portugal, 2002; Pellizzari, 2004; 
Delattre and Sabatier, 2007), and/or focussing on contacts with friends and relatives and 
excluding professional ties (Bentolila et al., 2004; Sylos Labini, 2004; Antoninis, 2006; 
Loury, 2006) have shown opposite results, finding that people entering the labour market 
through personal contacts receive on average lower wages.  
 
Bentolila et al. (2004) present a model where social contacts induce some workers to 
undertake careers in industries, professions, or firms where their comparative productive 
advantage is not fully exploited. The use of personal contacts as a labour market entry 
channel can create job-worker mismatches, which in turn may depress aggregate 
productivity and the returns to firms’ investment.  
 
The existence of such mismatches associated to the use of the informal recruitment channel 
seems to characterise the Italian labour market. In fact, empirical studies conducted in Italy 
mainly found a negative impact of the informal recruitment channel on wages. Pistaferri 
(1999) using the 1991 and 1993 Survey of Households Income and Wealth conducted by the 
Central Bank of Italy finds that the use of the informal channel reduces wages. He states that 
one possible interpretation of this result is that due to high hiring costs firms use informal 
networks when they have to fill low skill positions. The negative coefficient on the informal 
channel would therefore reflect lower unobserved skills and abilities.  
 
Pellizzari (2004), using data from the European Community Household Panel covering the 
period 1994-1999, also finds that in Italy people entering the labour market via personal 
contacts receive on average lower wages but that wage differentials tend to disappear with 
tenure. He concludes that lower wages cannot be due to compensating differentials (other 
advantages due to the use of the informal channel) but are more likely to depend on 
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educational requirements of the employer, and (b) the graduates’ self-assessment with respect to the 
competences and skills require to perform their job. 
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mismatches. He presents a model consistent with this result where employers invest more in 
formal recruitment activities for high productivity jobs so that matches created through 
formal channels are likely to be of average better quality than those created through informal 
networks.  
 
Sylos Labini (2004), using data from a survey run by the Italian National Bureau of 
Statistics (ISTAT) in 1998 on University graduates, finds that the use of the informal 
channel has a different impact on wages when distinguishing between family and 
professional ties, with family contacts leading to a wage discount and professional ones to a 
wage premium. He also finds that family ties tend to reduce the time spent searching. The 
results are consistent with his model predicting a different impact of professional and family 
ties on wages.   
 
Mosca and Pastore (2008) find that informal networks bring with them a wage penalty in the 
state sector, where formal hiring methods are common, and a wage premium in social 
cooperatives and religious institutions, where formal hiring methods are not common. They 
explain this result arguing that nonprofit organisations prefer informal recruitment methods 
not for nepotistic reasons, but for better selecting the most motivated workers.  
 
Finally, Meliciani and Radicchia (2011), using ISFOL data, find that, while workers 
entering the labour market via “professional ties” enjoy a wage bonus and a reduction in 
entry times, those recruited via “family and friends” referrals save on entry times but receive 
on average lower wages. Moreover, the use of the family channel reduces the returns to 
education and is associated with the phenomenon of “over-education”, suggesting the 
existence of some mismatches between workers’ and jobs’ characteristics. 
 
Overall, the studies focussing on Italy suggest that, in this country, the use of the informal 
channel, rather than reducing information asymmetries between employers and employees 
increases the probability of job-workers mismatches, thus contributing to the phenomenon 
of overeducation.  
 
2.3 Research hypotheses 
 
On the one hand, the literature on spatial flexibility and overeducation has shown that in 
Italy, or at least in some parts of the Italian territory, some forms of spatial mobility reduce 
overeducation. At the same time, the literature on the impact of family and friends referrals 
on the performance of workers in the labour market has found that the use of personal 
contacts is likely to increase job-workers mismatches. Until now, these two stands of 
literature have remained separated. However, it is likely that the choice of the recruitment 
channel impacts on the degree of workers’ spatial mobility. 
 
In particular, our main hypothesis is that the use of personal contacts as a labour market 
entry channel reduces the probability of finding a job in distant places with a negative 
impact on spatial mobility. If migration is inversely related to education-job mismatches, the 
use of the informal recruitment channel indirectly favours overeducation. Moreover, we also 
expect a direct (positive) impact of family and friends referrals on overeducation. In fact, the 
availability of social contacts and the opportunity to find a job more easily may convince a 
worker to sacrifice his productive comparative advantage, thus creating a mismatch between 
workers’ competencies and their occupational choices (Bentolila et al., 2004; Meliciani and 
Radicchia, 2011).  
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Previous studies have shown that the relationship between migration and overeducation in 
Italy is not so clear cut, and, in particular, it may vanish when accounting for job 
characteristics (Devillanova, 2013) or it may be specific to some parts of the territory 
(Iammarino and Marinelli, 2012). A final aim of this paper is to further investigate the 
relationship between spatial flexibility and overeducation in Italy, distinguishing between 
migration in the public and in the private sector and between migration directed to different 
areas of the Italian territory (North-West; North-East; Centre and South). 
 
Overall, finding empirical support for our hypotheses would suggest that policies devoted to 
improve labour market entry channels might have important positive effects on education-
job matches, thus increasing the returns to education, labour productivity and the quality of 
jobs. Moreover, such policies should not neglect the importance of favouring spatial 
flexibility by enhancing the probability of education-job matches occurring also outside the 
local labour market.  
 
3. Data and econometric methodology 
 
The study uses data from the survey Isfol Plus
8
 (Participation Labour Unemployment 
Survey, cross section 2011) focusing on the characteristics and the expectations of over 
40.000 individuals in the labour market in Italy, in 2011. The survey collects many 
information regarding occupational choice, like monthly wage, hours worked per week, job 
experience, sector of employment, type and size of enterprise, type of contract (permanent or 
fixed term), educational certification, attainment, particular skills and competencies and 
obviously on geographic mobility. In particular, to measure spatial mobility we have two 
indicators: commuting (measured as distance from the workplace in minutes) and internal 
migration for job, directed to different areas of the Italian territory (North-West; North-East; 
Centre and South). 
 
The workers’ self-assessment measure of over education can be constructed from the 
following question: “is your educational level relevant to perform your job?” and by 
defining as overeducated those employees with a level of education higher than the 
compulsory school answering “no” to the above mentioned question.  
 
The survey also gives answers to the question “How did you get your current job?”, offering 
a rich detail of the research methods used, both formal (through private or public 
employment service, by means of temporary-employment agency, via school or university, 
or by inserting or answering adverts in newspapers, by applying to the employer directly, by 
public competition, by starting own business or joining family business) and informal, 
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contacted through a dynamic CATI system without proxy interviews. Since the second wave of the survey 
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design is stratified over the Italian population aged 18-64. Strata are defined by regions, type of city 
(metropolitan/not metropolitan), age (5 classes), sex, and employment status(employed, unemployed, student, 
job retired, other inactive/housewife). The distribution of the sample is obtained through a multi-domain 
allocation procedure, developed specifically for the project PLUS (see Giammatteo, M., 2009). The extraction 
of the sample provides a process for quota. The reference population is derived from the annual averages of the 
Istat Labour Force Survey. The sixth edition of this annual survey came out in the second half of 2014.The 
Isfol Plus data are available online by accessing the open data section  http://www.isfol.it/open-data-delle-
ricerche/isfol-microdati.  
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making a distinction between people who get job by contacts with relatives and friends and 
through working and professional ties. Respondents can choose only one answer. 
 
The employed group involves 16,115 individuals but we limit our study to the impact of 
personal contacts on overeducation and spatial flexibility, therefore the initial sample consist 
of 13,097
9
 employees with a level of education higher than the compulsory school. 
 
Table 1 shows how the incidence of overeducation differs considerably by spatial flexibility 
(37% for no migrant and 28% for migrant) suggesting a negative relationship between 
migration and overeducation. The table also shows that the percentage of individuals that are 
overeducated changes significantly according to labour market entry channels10. In 
particular, the use of personal contacts increases education-job mismatches. Also the 
incidence of spatial flexibility (5.6%,) varies by channels: from the maximum of 10% of the 
public competition and the minimum of 1.30% of private recruitment agencies, but also the 
use of informal contact (family and friends) reduces the incidence of internal migration to 
3.5%. A preliminary descriptive analysis seems to confirm the research hypotheses. 
 
Table 1 – Incidence % of overeducation by spatial flexibility and labour market entry channels 
Employees with a level of education 
higher than the compulsory school by 
entry channels 
No spatial 
flexibility 
Spatial flexibility 
% Spatial 
flexibility 
Entry channels 
% Over-
educatio
n 
Std. 
Dev 
% Over-
educatio
n 
Std. 
Dev 
% Std. 
Dev 
% Std. 
Dev 
Public employment service 45.17 0.498 46.63 0.499 8.76 0.283 2.92 0.165 
Temporary-employment agency 58.88 0.492 71.30 0.452 2.97 0.170 2.54 0.154 
Private recruitment agencies 49.94 0.500 34.32 0.475 1.30 0.113 1.11 0.103 
School or university 16.71 0.373 8.71 0.282 4.53 0.208 3.75 0.186 
Insert or answer adverts in 
newspaper  
35.98 0.480 23.78 0.426 4.69 0.211 4.15 0.195 
Professional informal contact 41.30 0.492 52.41 0.499 6.79 0.251 6.83 0.247 
Informal contact (Family or friends) 51.82 0.500 52.70 0.499 3.52 0.184 24.67 0.425 
Direct application 40.26 0.499 27.99 0.449 4.36 0.204 17.47 0.373 
Public competition 
15.83 0.365 15.20 0.359 
10.0
8 
0.301 24.83 0.426 
Start own business or join family 
business 
40.28 0.490 18.90 0.391 2.80 0.165 11.39 0.312 
Total 37.13 0.484 28.37 0.451 5.63 0.227 100.0 
 
Source: ISFOL-PLUS 2011 
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(about 25%) and workers that find job via professional ties (about 7%). 
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The descriptive analysis suggests a negative relationship between migration and 
overeducation, a positive relationship between the use of the informal channel and 
overeducation and a negative relationship between the use of the informal channel and 
internal migration. However, the existence of a “causal” effect of the informal channel on 
migration and overeducation can only be assessed in a regression framework controlling for 
other factors affecting overeducation and migration, taking into account of possible 
“selection biases” and of the possible endogeneity of migration decisions. Therefore, in the 
regression analysis, we estimate the following equations: 
 
Poveri=1+1Migri+Infi+’Xi+ui  (1) 
Pworki=2+’Yi+i                                       (2) 
Pmigri=3+3Infi+’Zi+i  (3) 
 
where Poveri is the probability of being overeducated of individual i, Migr is a dummy 
variable equal to one for people who have migrated to find a job, Inf is a dummy variable 
equal to one for people entering the labour market through the use of the informal channel, 
and X, Y and Z are vectors of individual and job related characteristics assumed to affect 
respectively the probability of being overeducated, of working and of migrating. 
 
In particular in equations (1) and (3) we control for gender, the age (4 classes), the 
Provinces, the type of city (metropolitan/not metropolitan), the educational level (secondary 
school graduation or university), type of secondary school (Liceo or technical), the years  of 
schools lost (failed), the past training course, own particular skills and competencies, the 
type of contract, the level of qualification, the business sector, the type and size of firms, the 
recruitment channels and marital status. In equation (2) all occupational variables are not 
included since they would perfectly identify people employed, while we introduce the 
number of components of the family as instrument. 
 
As stated in Section 2.3, our main hypotheses are that the use of the informal channel 
increases overeducation and reduces migration, while migration reduces overeducation: 
1<0; 1>0 and 3<0. 
 
The estimation of the three equations above should cope with two methodological issues 
concerning sample selection and the possible endogeneity of migration choices. As far as the 
first issue is concerned, overeducation can be observed only if the individual actually works 
and there could be some unexplained factors that affect both the probability of being 
overeducated and the probability of self-selecting into work leading to biased estimates. For 
this reason we estimate equations (1) and (2) with the Heckman probit model using as 
instrument in the employment equation the number of members in the household (as in 
Devillanova, 2013). Secondly, there could be some unobserved factors affecting both the 
choice to migrate and the probability of being overeducated again leading to biased 
estimates. Croce and Ghignoni (2011), using as instrument long-term unemployment at 
origin, find no evidence of the endogeneity of migration. However, Devillanova (2013) 
criticizes the instrument proposed by Croce and Ghignoni and uses as an instrument the 
housing arrangement. Following Devillanova we use the same instrument but we do not find 
10 
 
evidence of endogeneity of migration so that equation (3) is estimated independently from 
the other equations using a probit model.  
 
4. Empirical results 
 
Tables 2 and 3 report the results of the estimations. In table 2 the overeducation equation 
does not include occupational variables that are instead introduced in Table 3. In each table 
column (1) reports the estimates of the probit regression, column (2) of the two step 
Heckman selection model, column (3) reports the estimates of the selection equation and 
column (4) the estimates of the probability to migrate.  
 
Consistently with Devillanova (2013), we find that, while in the estimates that do not 
include occupational variables migration significantly reduces overeducation, the variable 
loses significance when controlling for occupational variables. Again, in line with 
Devillanova (2013) and Croce and Ghignoni (2011), we find that commuting time is 
inversely related to overeducation in all regressions. However, differently from Devillanova, 
we do not find evidence of endogeneity of migration using the instruments that he suggests 
(the housing arrangement). On the other hand, we find a significant lambda coefficient in the 
Heckman procedure confirming the concern that the probability of being overeducated 
might be significantly correlated with the probability of being employed. Since this result 
holds across all specifications, our comments refer to the estimates of the two steps 
Heckman procedure. 
 
The main concern of our paper is to assess the impact of the informal channel on 
overeducation. Consistently with our expectations, regression results both including and 
excluding occupational variables show that workers entering the labour market through the 
informal channel (family and friends referrals) have a higher probability of being 
overeducated and a lower probability to migrate. Regression results also show that 
overeducation is lower for university graduates with respect to people with only secondary 
education (university also increases the probability to be employed and the probability to 
migrate), while it is higher for people who have failed in their studies. Other interesting 
robust effects are the negative impact of having attended a training course on the probability 
of being overeducated (having attended a training course also increases the probability of 
being employed and the probability to migrate) and the higher probability of being 
overeducated in urban areas and, as expected, for foreigners. Finally, less expected is the 
evidence that overeducation is higher for singles and for people with sons while it is lower 
for women with sons.  
 
Table 2 - Regression results of overeducation equation without occupational variables 
  Probit Heck probit Selection equation Probit 
VARIABLES 
Over education 
(1) 
Over education 
(2)  
Employed 
(3) 
Migration 
(4) 
Migrant -0.157** -0.133** 
  
 
(0.0611) (0.0522) 
  Commuting time -0.00491*** -0.00428*** 
 
0.00455*** 
 
(0.000845) (0.000720) 
 
(0.000981) 
Foreigner 0.918*** 0.762*** 0.0519 -0.0269 
 
(0.143) (0.132) (0.0901) (0.222) 
Gender (woman=1) 0.00797 -0.0722** -0.177*** -0.181*** 
 
(0.0359) (0.0323) (0.0215) (0.0574) 
Sons 0.249*** 0.202*** -0.117*** -0.0753 
 
(0.0607) (0.0545) (0.0428) (0.106) 
Woman*sons -0.264*** -0.193*** 0.0659* -0.0122 
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  Probit Heck probit Selection equation Probit 
VARIABLES 
Over education 
(1) 
Over education 
(2)  
Employed 
(3) 
Migration 
(4) 
 
(0.0545) (0.0496) (0.0349) (0.0825) 
Type secondary (Liceo) 0.144*** -0.0106 -0.307*** 0.0887* 
 
(0.0325) (0.0341) (0.0187) (0.0474) 
University -0.567*** -0.319*** 0.381*** 0.205*** 
 
(0.0335) (0.0469) (0.0196) (0.0492) 
Failed 0.225*** 0.185*** 0.00120 -0.0898 
 
(0.0364) (0.0334) (0.0235) (0.0613) 
Metropolitan City  0.202*** 0.181*** 0.0441 -0.160 
 
(0.0744) (0.0657) (0.0449) (0.111) 
North West 0.215 0.460 0.649*** -0.349 
 
(0.362) (0.312) (0.186) (0.599) 
North  East 0.692* 0.773** 0.398* 0.463 
 
(0.401) (0.346) (0.220) (0.594) 
Centre 0.643* 0.681** 4.899 0.452 
 
(0.379) (0.326) (46.57) (0.575) 
Single 0.199*** 0.146*** -0.138*** -0.0566 
 
(0.0509) (0.0456) (0.0356) (0.0858) 
Divorced -0.00282 0.0252 0.0837 -0.0452 
 
(0.0770) (0.0689) (0.0544) (0.128) 
Widower 0.0156 -0.158 -0.389*** 0.0664 
 
(0.125) (0.110) (0.0695) (0.161) 
Age 30-39 -0.0774** 0.140*** 0.451*** -0.0638 
 
(0.0391) (0.0431) (0.0267) (0.0640) 
Age 40-49 -0.203*** 0.155** 0.770*** -0.0342 
 
(0.0547) (0.0658) (0.0402) (0.0834) 
Age over 49 -0.475*** -0.225*** 0.394*** -0.0925 
 
(0.0470) (0.0562) (0.0340) (0.0740) 
Skills (languages and pc) -0.302*** -0.0507 0.420*** 0.227 
 
(0.0811) (0.0776) (0.0456) (0.158) 
Training course -0.375*** -0.119*** 0.499*** 0.232*** 
 
(0.0291) (0.0419) (0.0189) (0.0420) 
Informal channel (Family and friends) 0.417*** 0.342*** 
 
-0.318*** 
 
(0.0302) (0.0322) 
 
(0.0573) 
N. of component= 2 
  
-0.246*** -0.284*** 
   
(0.0356) (0.0848) 
N. of component= 3 
  
-0.0579* -0.176 
   
(0.0338) (0.112) 
N. of component> 3 
  
-0.0487 -0.195* 
   
(0.0339) (0.114) 
Housing arrangement: Rent 
   
0.440*** 
    
(0.0608) 
Housing arrangement: Young Adult Living 
   
-0.292*** 
    
(0.108) 
Provincial fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Constant -0.265 -1.335*** -1.031*** -1.647*** 
 
(0.347) (0.318) (0.173) (0.551) 
Athrho 
 
0.883*** 
  
  
(0.157) 
  Observations 11,283 26,796 26,796 11,066 
Smith-Blundell test of exogeneity of migration:  1.020038  Chi-sqr( 1)  P-value =  .3125 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
Looking at occupational variables (Table 3), we find, as expected, that overeducation is 
lower for people with higher qualifications, it is higher in private firms and in firms with 
temporary contracts. There are also significant differences across sectors with overeducation 
being higher in agriculture, industry and the commercial sector and lower in construction 
(base category Services). Migration is lower in the industrial sector and is higher in medium 
and large firms with respect to small firms, while there is no significant difference between 
private and public employment. 
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Due to the lack of significance of migration on overeducation in the equation including 
occupational variables, we tried to assess which variable was responsible of the results and 
we found that migration loses significance when the dummy for employment in private 
firms is introduced in the regression. Since overeducation is much more likely to happen in 
private firms (45%) than in public ones (19%), we decided to estimate the relationship 
between migration and overeducation focussing only on the private sector. 
 
Table 3 - Regression results of overeducation equation with occupational variables 
  Probit Heck probit Selection equation Probit 
VARIABLES 
Over education 
(1) 
Over education  
(2)  
Employed 
(3) 
Migration 
(4) 
Migrant -0.0954 -0.0838 
  
 
(0.0661) (0.0575) 
  Commuting time -0.00354*** -0.00319*** 
 
0.00431*** 
 
(0.000871) (0.000754) 
 
(0.00101) 
Foreigner 0.624*** 0.524*** 0.00357 0.0855 
 
(0.143) (0.130) (0.0911) (0.224) 
Woman 0.0694* -0.0102 -0.171*** -0.178*** 
 
(0.0385) (0.0356) (0.0217) (0.0604) 
Sons 0.241*** 0.198*** -0.129*** -0.0622 
 
(0.0646) (0.0587) (0.0430) (0.108) 
Woman*sons -0.224*** -0.164*** 0.0699** -0.0157 
 
(0.0578) (0.0531) (0.0351) (0.0848) 
Type secondary (Liceo) 0.218*** 0.0676* -0.305*** 0.0973** 
 
(0.0344) (0.0367) (0.0188) (0.0484) 
University -0.278*** -0.0929** 0.384*** 0.155*** 
 
(0.0375) (0.0414) (0.0197) (0.0527) 
Failed 0.180*** 0.152*** 0.00249 -0.0816 
 
(0.0385) (0.0352) (0.0237) (0.0629) 
Metropolitan City 0.217*** 0.200*** 0.0473 -0.0819 
 
(0.0764) (0.0687) (0.0452) (0.115) 
North West 0.108 0.367 0.683*** -0.386 
 
(0.360) (0.315) (0.186) (0.596) 
North  East 0.542 0.645* 0.421* 0.499 
 
(0.410) (0.360) (0.220) (0.595) 
Centre 0.349 0.441 4.782 0.511 
 
(0.382) (0.334) (17.17) (0.575) 
Single 0.146*** 0.105** -0.141*** -0.0151 
 
(0.0532) (0.0480) (0.0359) (0.0863) 
Divorced 0.0108 0.0280 0.0805 -0.0136 
 
(0.0833) (0.0752) (0.0548) (0.127) 
Widower -0.00308 -0.169 -0.393*** 0.104 
 
(0.131) (0.118) (0.0700) (0.161) 
Age 30-39 0.0151 0.206*** 0.463*** -0.0471 
 
(0.0409) (0.0430) (0.0269) (0.0657) 
Age 40-49 -0.0149 0.291*** 0.780*** -0.0688 
 
(0.0584) (0.0640) (0.0404) (0.0865) 
Age over 49 -0.115** 0.0682 0.414*** -0.142* 
 
(0.0518) (0.0524) (0.0340) (0.0784) 
Skills (languages and pc) -0.122 0.0806 0.423*** 0.173 
 
(0.0868) (0.0808) (0.0458) (0.159) 
Training course -0.261*** -0.0396 0.504*** 0.205*** 
 
(0.0309) (0.0394) (0.0189) (0.0436) 
Informal channel (Family and friends) 0.270*** 0.231*** 
 
-0.206*** 
 
(0.0322) (0.0291) 
 
(0.0601) 
High level qualification (Base cat. low qualification) -1.122*** -0.960*** 
 
0.0540 
 
(0.0561) (0.0641) 
 
(0.0911) 
Median level qualification -0.580*** -0.489*** 
 
-0.000871 
 
(0.0468) (0.0469) 
 
(0.0844) 
Agriculture (base cat. Services) 0.488*** 0.410*** 
 
-0.295 
 
(0.109) (0.0954) 
 
(0.199) 
Industry sector 0.160*** 0.142*** 
 
-0.223*** 
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  Probit Heck probit Selection equation Probit 
VARIABLES 
Over education 
(1) 
Over education  
(2)  
Employed 
(3) 
Migration 
(4) 
 
(0.0472) (0.0408) 
 
(0.0865) 
Construction sector -0.203*** -0.169** 
 
-0.145 
 
(0.0772) (0.0667) 
 
(0.136) 
Commercial sector 0.600*** 0.505*** 
 
-0.0110 
 
(0.0387) (0.0415) 
 
(0.0704) 
Fixed term contract -0.233*** -0.205*** 
 
0.0117 
 
(0.0316) (0.0276) 
 
(0.0511) 
Private firms 0.351*** 0.310*** 
 
-0.0311 
 
(0.0461) (0.0411) 
 
(0.0646) 
Medium firms (15-100) 0.00619 0.00928 
 
0.267*** 
 
(0.0409) (0.0348) 
 
(0.0694) 
Large firms (over 100) 0.00948 0.0101 
 
0.271*** 
 
(0.0426) (0.0365) 
 
(0.0706) 
N. of component= 2 (Base cat. 1 comp.) 
  
-0.239*** -0.255*** 
   
(0.0363) (0.0862) 
N. of component= 3 
  
-0.0411 -0.144 
   
(0.0345) (0.114) 
N. of component> 3 
  
-0.0297 -0.183 
   
(0.0345) (0.117) 
Housing arrangement: Rent 
   
0.425*** 
    
(0.0618) 
Housing arrangement: Young Adult Living 
   
-0.275** 
 (0.111) 
Provincial fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Constant -0.207 -1.240*** -1.108*** -1.786*** 
 
(0.352) (0.326) (0.172) (0.562) 
Athrho 
  
0.781*** 
 
   
(0.134) 
 
     Observations 11,115 26,628 26,628 10,904 
Smith-Blundell test of exogeneity of migration:   3.28059  Chi-sqr( 1)  P-value =  .0701 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
Table 4 reports the results for all equations (overeducation, employment and migration) 
focussing only on employment in private firms. The results show that migration reduces 
overeducation also when controlling for occupational variables, although the variable is 
significant only at 10%. Again, it is interesting to observe that the informal channel 
increases overeducation and reduces migration also when the sample does not include public 
employment. Finally, the inverse relationship between commuting time and overeducation 
holds also when restricting the sample to the private sector. 
 
Table 4 - Results of overeducation equation with occupational variables in private firms 
  Probit Heck probit Selection equation Probit 
VARIABLES 
Over education 
(1) 
Over education  
(2)  
Employed 
(3) 
Migration 
(4) 
Migrant -0.147* -0.122* 
  
 
(0.0841) (0.0637) 
  Commuting time -0.00377*** -0.00311*** 
 
0.00550*** 
 
(0.00104) (0.000789) 
 
(0.00142) 
Foreigner 0.689*** 0.640*** 0.204** 0.174 
 
(0.154) (0.127) (0.0928) (0.237) 
Woman 0.0654 -0.0619* -0.213*** -0.251*** 
 
(0.0424) (0.0364) (0.0227) (0.0751) 
Sons 0.142* 0.166*** 0.0271 -0.275 
 
(0.0770) (0.0623) (0.0493) (0.174) 
Woman*sons -0.119* -0.186*** -0.181*** -0.0772 
 
(0.0707) (0.0573) (0.0413) (0.126) 
Type secondary (Liceo) 0.276*** -0.00996 -0.388*** 0.131* 
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  Probit Heck probit Selection equation Probit 
VARIABLES 
Over education 
(1) 
Over education  
(2)  
Employed 
(3) 
Migration 
(4) 
 
(0.0409) (0.0464) (0.0210) (0.0675) 
University -0.312*** -0.117*** 0.225*** 0.307*** 
 
(0.0449) (0.0443) (0.0222) (0.0708) 
Failed 0.175*** 0.138*** 0.0140 -0.0742 
 
(0.0447) (0.0375) (0.0257) (0.0847) 
Metropolitan City 0.121 0.126* 0.0587 -0.103 
 
(0.0879) (0.0712) (0.0491) (0.147) 
North West 0.185 0.550* 0.807*** -1.014 
 
(0.406) (0.319) (0.209) (0.704) 
North  East 0.586 0.674* 0.543** -0.794 
 
(0.465) (0.365) (0.243) (0.729) 
Centre 0.389 0.561* 4.722 -0.189 
 
(0.422) (0.333) (6.677) (0.605) 
single 0.105* 0.0647 -0.0996** -0.0634 
 
(0.0614) (0.0504) (0.0407) (0.122) 
Divorced -0.0244 0.0358 0.129** -0.0449 
 
(0.108) (0.0870) (0.0658) (0.219) 
Widower -0.00640 -0.247* -0.330*** -0.419 
 
(0.187) (0.147) (0.0905) (0.327) 
Age 30-39 0.0482 0.263*** 0.423*** -0.0688 
 
(0.0461) (0.0416) (0.0289) (0.0831) 
Age 40-49 0.0195 0.296*** 0.553*** -0.143 
 
(0.0697) (0.0629) (0.0448) (0.118) 
Age over 49 -0.0745 -0.146*** -0.148*** -0.176 
 
(0.0636) (0.0518) (0.0411) (0.114) 
Skills (languages and pc) -0.228** 0.0104 0.262*** 0.253 
 
(0.111) (0.0928) (0.0532) (0.233) 
Training course -0.254*** -0.0327 0.309*** 0.235*** 
 
(0.0378) (0.0402) (0.0222) (0.0622) 
Informal channel (Family and friends) 0.242*** 0.180*** 
 
-0.210*** 
 
(0.0340) (0.0286) 
 
(0.0652) 
High level qualification (Base cat. low qual) -1.070*** -0.794*** 
 
-0.0878 
 
(0.0639) (0.0755) 
 
(0.114) 
Median level qualification -0.540*** -0.390*** 
 
-0.0341 
 
(0.0517) (0.0500) 
 
(0.101) 
Agriculture(Base cat. Services) 0.521*** 0.374*** 
 
-0.607** 
 
(0.117) (0.0928) 
 
(0.295) 
Industry sector 0.167*** 0.132*** 
 
-0.228** 
 
(0.0501) (0.0384) 
 
(0.0986) 
Construction sector -0.246*** -0.164*** 
 
-0.133 
 
(0.0806) (0.0631) 
 
(0.153) 
Commercial sector 0.583*** 0.425*** 
 
0.0421 
 
(0.0412) (0.0479) 
 
(0.0776) 
Fixed term contract -0.259*** -0.199*** 
 
0.0154 
 
(0.0358) (0.0300) 
 
(0.0642) 
Medium firms (15-100) 0.0259 0.0203 
 
0.243*** 
 
(0.0411) (0.0304) 
 
(0.0713) 
Large firms (over 100) 0.0268 0.0179 
 
0.246*** 
 
(0.0432) (0.0322) 
 
(0.0736) 
N. of component= 2 
  
-0.170*** -0.369*** 
   
(0.0399) (0.125) 
N. of component= 3 
  
-0.0169 -0.00718 
   
(0.0374) (0.182) 
N. of component> 3 
  
-0.00590 0.0389 
   
(0.0375) (0.184) 
Housing arrangement: Rent 
   
0.365*** 
    
(0.0839) 
Housing arrangement: Young Adult Living 
   
-0.619*** 
    
(0.169) 
Provincial fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.167 -1.140*** -1.022*** -0.871 
 
(0.395) (0.328) (0.197) (0.599) 
athrho 
  
1.106*** 
 
   
(0.194) 
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  Probit Heck probit Selection equation Probit 
VARIABLES 
Over education 
(1) 
Over education  
(2)  
Employed 
(3) 
Migration 
(4) 
     Observations 7,220 22,796 22,796 6,553 
Smith-Blundell test of exogeneity of migration:  3.421617  Chi-sqr( 1)  P-value =  .0643 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
Since Italy is a country with large differences in income per capita and unemployment rates 
across geographical areas, we wanted to test whether it is especially migration towards the 
richer parts of the territory (North-West and North-East) that contributes to reduce 
overeducation.  
Table 5 reports the distribution of job-related migration across different areas of the Italian 
territory. The table shows that the internal mobility for job (equal to 5.6% of employees with 
a level of education higher than the compulsory school) is mostly intra-regional migration: 
54% of total migration towards the North-West is intra-regional, while the percentages of 
intra-regional migration in the other areas are 74% in the North-East, 67% in the Centre and 
50.5% in the South. Migration from the South towards the other parts of the country 
concerns the 49% of migrants, while the migration from North West involves the 46% of 
individuals who have moved for work. 
 
Table 5 - Distribution of job-related migration across different areas of the Italian territory 
  Macro-Region of Destination 
Macro-Region of origin North-West North-East Centre South Total 
North-West 54.0 14.7 12.0 19.4 100.0 
North-East 14.5 74.3 4.2 7.0 100.0 
Centre 12.2 2.0 67.1 18.7 100.0 
South 18.2 15.1 16.2 50.5 100.0 
Total 25.9 21.0 20.2 32.9 100.0 
Source: ISFOL-PLUS 2011 
 
Table 6 reports the results of the overeducation equation (using the two step Heckman 
procedure) distinguishing between four different geographical areas: North-West, North-
East, Centre and South.  
 
Table 6 - Regression results of overeducation equation with occupational variables between 
different geographical areas 
  All sample  Only Private firm All sample Only Private firm 
VARIABLES Heck probit 
Selection 
equation 
Heck 
probit 
Selection 
equation 
Heck 
probit 
Selection 
equation 
Heck 
probit 
Selection 
equation 
Migration vs North 
West -0.341** 
 
-0.425*** 
     
 
(0.138) 
 
(0.150) 
     Migration vs North 
East 0.120 
 
-0.0208 
     
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.138) 
     Migration vs Centre 0.139 
 
0.124 
     
 
(0.119) 
 
(0.139) 
     Migration vs South -0.160* 
 
-0.115 
     
 
(0.0897) 
 
(0.102) 
     Migration inter 
North West 
    
-0.409** 
 
-0.672*** 
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  All sample  Only Private firm All sample Only Private firm 
VARIABLES Heck probit 
Selection 
equation 
Heck 
probit 
Selection 
equation 
Heck 
probit 
Selection 
equation 
Heck 
probit 
Selection 
equation 
     
(0.196) 
 
(0.228) 
 Migrat to North 
West from outside 
    
-0.266 
 
-0.161 
 
     
(0.192) 
 
(0.206) 
 Migration inter 
South 
    
-0.180* 
 
-0.109 
 
     
(0.102) 
 
(0.114) 
 Mig. to South from 
outside 
    
-0.104 
 
-0.142 
 
     
(0.174) 
 
(0.215) 
 Commuting time -0.00324*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
 
(0.00075) 
 
(0.00079) 
 
(0.00075) 
 
(0.00079) 
 Foreigner 0.531*** 0.00375 0.590*** 0.151 0.530*** 0.00371 0.595*** 0.151 
 
(0.131) (0.0911) (0.129) (0.0943) (0.131) (0.0911) (0.130) (0.0943) 
Woman -0.0104 -0.171*** -0.0682* -0.215*** -0.0110 -0.171*** -0.0684* -0.215*** 
 
(0.0357) (0.0217) (0.0364) (0.0228) (0.0356) (0.0217) (0.0365) (0.0228) 
Sons 0.198*** -0.130*** 0.163*** 0.0287 0.198*** -0.130*** 0.162*** 0.0287 
 
(0.0587) (0.0430) (0.0625) (0.0495) (0.0586) (0.0430) (0.0626) (0.0495) 
Woman*sons -0.165*** 0.0699** -0.185*** -0.180*** -0.165*** 0.0699** -0.18*** -0.179*** 
 
(0.0531) (0.0351) (0.0575) (0.0414) (0.0531) (0.0351) (0.0576) (0.0414) 
Type secondary 
(Liceo) 0.0679* -0.305*** -0.0106 -0.387*** 0.0682* -0.305*** -0.00907 -0.387*** 
 
(0.0368) (0.0188) (0.0461) (0.0210) (0.0367) (0.0188) (0.0461) (0.0210) 
University -0.0907** 0.384*** -0.113** 0.226*** -0.0900** 0.384*** -0.113** 0.226*** 
 
(0.0414) (0.0197) (0.0441) (0.0222) (0.0413) (0.0197) (0.0442) (0.0222) 
Failed 0.154*** 0.00258 0.136*** 0.0158 0.153*** 0.00257 0.136*** 0.0158 
 
(0.0352) (0.0237) (0.0374) (0.0257) (0.0352) (0.0237) (0.0375) (0.0257) 
Metropolitan City 0.203*** 0.0474 0.124* 0.0618 0.202*** 0.0474 0.121* 0.0614 
 
(0.0687) (0.0452) (0.0712) (0.0492) (0.0687) (0.0452) (0.0713) (0.0492) 
Single 0.104** -0.14*** 0.0594 -0.0995** 0.103** -0.141*** 0.0596 -0.0994** 
 
(0.0480) (0.0359) (0.0506) (0.0409) (0.0480) (0.0359) (0.0506) (0.0408) 
Divorced 0.0293 0.0803 0.0288 0.118* 0.0296 0.0804 0.0277 0.119* 
 
(0.0750) (0.0547) (0.0877) (0.0662) (0.0750) (0.0547) (0.0879) (0.0662) 
Widower -0.170 -0.393*** -0.232 -0.340*** -0.170 -0.393*** -0.233 -0.339*** 
 
(0.118) (0.0700) (0.148) (0.0916) (0.118) (0.0700) (0.148) (0.0916) 
Age 30-39 0.206*** 0.463*** 0.262*** 0.424*** 0.206*** 0.463*** 0.262*** 0.425*** 
 
(0.0432) (0.0269) (0.0417) (0.0290) (0.0431) (0.0269) (0.0417) (0.0290) 
Age 40-49 0.290*** 0.780*** 0.297*** 0.552*** 0.290*** 0.780*** 0.297*** 0.552*** 
 
(0.0642) (0.0404) (0.0629) (0.0449) (0.0641) (0.0404) (0.0630) (0.0449) 
Age over 49 0.0694 0.414*** -0.147*** -0.150*** 0.0687 0.414*** -0.147*** -0.150*** 
 
(0.0525) (0.0340) (0.0520) (0.0412) (0.0524) (0.0340) (0.0521) (0.0412) 
Skills (languages 
and pc) 0.0811 0.423*** 0.0161 0.273*** 0.0805 0.423*** 0.0128 0.273*** 
 
(0.0809) (0.0458) (0.0933) (0.0536) (0.0808) (0.0458) (0.0934) (0.0536) 
Training course -0.0415 0.504*** -0.0317 0.310*** -0.0391 0.504*** -0.0307 0.310*** 
 
(0.0395) (0.0189) (0.0402) (0.0222) (0.0394) (0.0189) (0.0402) (0.0222) 
Informal channel 
(Family and friends) 0.230*** 
 
0.178*** 
 
0.230*** 
 
0.178*** 
 
 
(0.0291) 
 
(0.0285) 
 
(0.0291) 
 
(0.0285) 
 High level 
qualification (Base 
cat. low qual) -0.961*** 
 
-0.798*** 
 
-0.960*** 
 
-0.79*** 
 
 
(0.0644) 
 
(0.0750) 
 
(0.0641) 
 
(0.0747) 
 Median level 
qualification -0.491*** 
 
-0.395*** 
 
-0.490*** 
 
-0.39*** 
 
 
(0.0471) 
 
(0.0501) 
 
(0.0469) 
 
(0.0500) 
 Agriculture(Base 
cat. Services) 0.411*** 
 
0.374*** 
 
0.409*** 
 
0.375*** 
 
 
(0.0956) 
 
(0.0926) 
 
(0.0954) 
 
(0.0926) 
 Industry sector 0.141*** 
 
0.130*** 
 
0.141*** 
 
0.130*** 
 
 
(0.0408) 
 
(0.0384) 
 
(0.0408) 
 
(0.0385) 
 Construction sector -0.171** 
 
-0.173*** 
 
-0.170** 
 
-0.17*** 
 
 
(0.0667) 
 
(0.0635) 
 
(0.0667) 
 
(0.0635) 
 Commercial sector 0.505*** 
 
0.425*** 
 
0.505*** 
 
0.426*** 
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  All sample  Only Private firm All sample Only Private firm 
VARIABLES Heck probit 
Selection 
equation 
Heck 
probit 
Selection 
equation 
Heck 
probit 
Selection 
equation 
Heck 
probit 
Selection 
equation 
 
(0.0416) 
 
(0.0473) 
 
(0.0415) 
 
(0.0473) 
 Fixed term contract -0.205*** 
 
-0.194*** 
 
-0.205*** 
 
-0.19*** 
 
 
(0.0276) 
 
(0.0298) 
 
(0.0276) 
 
(0.0298) 
 Private firm 0.311*** 
   
0.310*** 
   
 
(0.0411) 
   
(0.0411) 
   Medium firms (15-
100) 0.00994 
 
0.0215 
 
0.0106 
 
0.0216 
 
 
(0.0348) 
 
(0.0305) 
 
(0.0348) 
 
(0.0305) 
 Large firms (over 
100) 0.0104 
 
0.0183 
 
0.0109 
 
0.0174 
 
 
(0.0365) 
 
(0.0324) 
 
(0.0365) 
 
(0.0324) 
 North West 
 
0.682*** 
 
0.807*** 
 
0.682*** 
 
0.807*** 
  
(0.186) 
 
(0.209) 
 
(0.186) 
 
(0.209) 
North  East 
 
0.422* 
 
0.505** 
 
0.421* 
 
0.505** 
  
(0.220) 
 
(0.243) 
 
(0.220) 
 
(0.243) 
Centre 
 
4.781 
 
4.701 
 
4.769 
 
4.725 
  
(10.38) 
 
(19.26) 
   
(19.41) 
N. of component= 2 
 
-0.240*** 
 
-0.169*** 
 
-0.239*** 
 
-0.168*** 
  
(0.0363) 
 
(0.0401) 
 
(0.0363) 
 
(0.0401) 
N. of component= 3 
 
-0.0411 
 
-0.0168 
 
-0.0408 
 
-0.0166 
  
(0.0345) 
 
(0.0376) 
 
(0.0345) 
 
(0.0376) 
N. of component> 3 
 
-0.0294 
 
-0.00546 
 
-0.0292 
 
-0.00536 
  
(0.0345) 
 
(0.0377) 
 
(0.0345) 
 
(0.0377) 
Provincial fixed 
effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant -1.232*** -1.107*** -1.14*** -1.033*** -1.238*** -1.108*** -1.133*** -1.033*** 
 
(0.328) (0.173) (0.328) (0.197) (0.324) (0.172) (0.328) (0.197) 
Athrho 0.783*** 
 
1.106*** 
 
0.784*** 
 
1.102*** 
 
 
(0.134) 
 
(0.190) 
 
(0.134) 
 
(0.189) 
 Observations 26,628 26,628 22,733 22,733 26,628 26,628 22,733 22,733 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The table reports the results for the whole sample (column 1) and for the sample including 
only people employed in the private sector (column 2) and distinguishing for the area of 
destination of migrants (columns 3 and 4). The results show that, when considering both the 
private and public sectors, not only migration towards the North West but also migration 
towards the South reduce overeducation, while there is no significant relationship between 
migration and overeducation in the other geographical areas. When focussing only on 
private firms, migration reduces overeducation only when it is directed towards the North-
Western part of the territory. Finally, in columns (3) and (4) of table 5 we investigate 
whether inter-area migration (from the North-West to the North-West and from the South to 
the South) and intra-area migration (migration from other areas of the territory to the North-
West or the South) have a differentiated impact on overeducation. The results show that only 
inter-area migration contributes to reduce overeducation and this holds both in the North-
West and in the South. Again, in the South the results are not significant when we focus only 
on the private sector. 
 
Overall our results partly confirm those found by Iammarino and Marinelli (2012), 
signalling differences in the impact of migration on overeducation in different areas of the 
Italian territory. However, while they find that only migration towards the North reduces 
overeducation, we find that this occurs also in the South in the sample including both private 
and public employment. The different results might depend on the different sample and on 
the different measure of migration used. First their sample includes only graduates, secondly 
their migrants are those individuals whose region of study is different from the region of 
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current employment and residence (excluding graduates who leave the region of study to go 
back to their home region, that are, however imperfectly identified). On the other hand, our 
sample includes both graduates and people with a secondary degree and our migrants are 
individuals that have migrated to find an occupation in the current job. As a consequence 
our significant results for migration within the South on overeducation might depend on the 
fact that our sample, differently from that of Iammarino and Marinelli, includes individuals 
with a secondary degree migrating for job reasons (most likely from smaller to larger towns) 
and individuals attending university outside their province of residence but migrating only 
after finding a job. 
 
Overall, the results of our regression suggest that migration reduces overeducation in the 
North-Western part of the territory, what could be expected considering that this is the part 
of Italy with a more diffused presence of large firms employing people with higher levels of 
education. However, less expected is the result that only migration within the North-Western 
area reduces overeducation while this is not the case for migration from the South. This 
unexpected result is partly consistent with the observation of Devillanova (2013) who makes 
an attempt to establish a bridge between the literature on internal and international mobility 
and overeducation. It appears that in Italy migration from the South to the North resembles 
to international migration responding more to the need of simply finding a job rather than to 
the need of finding the “right”  job, i.e. the job corresponding to workers’ levels of 
education.  
 
Going back to the main question of our paper, i.e. the impact of the informal recruitment 
channel on migration and overeducation, the results robustly show how this channel 
significantly increases the employer-employees mismatch by increasing overeducation both 
directly and indirectly by reducing migration. But which recruitment channels perform 
better than the informal one? Table 7 investigates the impact of recruitment channels 
different from the informal one (the base category) on migration and overeducation. 
Looking at the migration equation, we find that people entering the labour market through 
public recruitment agencies, schools and universities, reading from newspapers, professional 
contacts, direct applications and public competitions all have a higher probability to migrate 
with respect to people entering the labour market via the family and friends recruitment 
channel. Moreover, all these channels (with the exception of public recruitment agencies) 
reduce overeducation with respect to the informal one. On the other side, the impact of 
temporary work agencies and private recruitment agencies does not differ from that of the 
informal channel. These results show the lack of an efficient public and private recruitment 
system in Italy based on specialised agencies providing information on workers and job 
characteristics and allowing a better matching between employers and employees. Such a 
system should be implemented, as suggested also by the European Commission, in order to 
reduce the use of the informal channel and to increase the reward of the investment in 
human capital. 
 
 
Table 7 - Regression results of the impact of recruitment channels different from the informal 
one (the base category) on migration and overeducation 
  Probit Heck probit Selection equation Probit 
VARIABLES 
Over education 
(1) 
Over education  
(2)  
Employed 
(3) 
Migration 
(4) 
Migrant -0.126 -0.105* 
  
 
(0.0853) (0.0633) 
  Commuting time -0.00365*** -0.00299*** 
 
0.00529*** 
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  Probit Heck probit Selection equation Probit 
VARIABLES 
Over education 
(1) 
Over education  
(2)  
Employed 
(3) 
Migration 
(4) 
 
(0.00105) (0.000785) 
 
(0.00144) 
Foreigner 0.681*** 0.624*** 0.205** 0.168 
 
(0.156) (0.127) (0.0928) (0.237) 
Woman 0.0614 -0.0685* -0.213*** -0.269*** 
 
(0.0427) (0.0361) (0.0227) (0.0758) 
Sons 0.150* 0.169*** 0.0301 -0.265 
 
(0.0772) (0.0619) (0.0494) (0.174) 
Woman*sons -0.114 -0.183*** -0.181*** -0.0775 
 
(0.0710) (0.0567) (0.0413) (0.127) 
Type secondary (Liceo) 0.276*** -0.0213 -0.388*** 0.139** 
 
(0.0410) (0.0470) (0.0210) (0.0681) 
University -0.297*** -0.0972** 0.225*** 0.310*** 
 
(0.0450) (0.0443) (0.0222) (0.0709) 
Failed 0.175*** 0.136*** 0.0135 -0.0820 
 
(0.0447) (0.0369) (0.0256) (0.0848) 
Metropolitan City 0.130 0.131* 0.0593 -0.139 
 
(0.0885) (0.0706) (0.0490) (0.147) 
North West 0.251 0.602* 0.809*** -0.957 
 
(0.400) (0.310) (0.208) (0.697) 
North  East 0.630 0.705** 0.540** -0.791 
 
(0.456) (0.353) (0.242) (0.728) 
Centre 0.460 0.609* 4.899 -0.150 
 
(0.416) (0.324) 
 
(0.600) 
Single 0.117* 0.0705 -0.0980** -0.0572 
 
(0.0617) (0.0501) (0.0407) (0.122) 
Divorced -0.0255 0.0368 0.129** -0.0544 
 
(0.109) (0.0866) (0.0658) (0.219) 
Widower -0.0411 -0.274* -0.330*** -0.418 
 
(0.185) (0.143) (0.0904) (0.327) 
Age 30-39 0.0289 0.255*** 0.422*** -0.0495 
 
(0.0465) (0.0417) (0.0289) (0.0840) 
Age 40-49 0.00865 0.297*** 0.551*** -0.115 
 
(0.0702) (0.0628) (0.0448) (0.119) 
Age over 49 -0.0745 -0.146*** -0.150*** -0.161 
 
(0.0649) (0.0520) (0.0411) (0.117) 
Skills (languages and pc) -0.208* 0.0324 0.262*** 0.257 
 
(0.111) (0.0908) (0.0532) (0.233) 
Training course -0.237*** -0.0137 0.309*** 0.238*** 
Entry Channels (family and friend) (0.0382) (0.0396) (0.0222) (0.0624) 
Public recruitment agencies -0.0546 -0.0328 
 
0.297* 
 
(0.0974) (0.0695) 
 
(0.160) 
Temporary work agencies -0.0153 -0.0169 
 
0.136 
 
(0.0879) (0.0633) 
 
(0.157) 
Private recruitment agencies -0.108 -0.0794 
 
-0.233 
 
(0.123) (0.0907) 
 
(0.239) 
Schools and Universities -0.861*** -0.641*** 
 
0.283** 
 
(0.0994) (0.0829) 
 
(0.133) 
Insert or answer adverts in newspaper -0.268*** -0.204*** 
 
0.523*** 
 
(0.0819) (0.0610) 
 
(0.125) 
Professional informal contact -0.209*** -0.153*** 
 
0.261** 
 
(0.0649) (0.0495) 
 
(0.112) 
Direct application -0.212*** -0.153*** 
 
0.205** 
 
(0.0425) (0.0339) 
 
(0.0798) 
Public competitions -0.486*** -0.358*** 
 
0.406*** 
 
(0.0864) (0.0682) 
 
(0.123) 
Start own business or join family business -0.283*** -0.209*** 
 
-0.136 
 
(0.0676) (0.0524) 
 
(0.144) 
High level qualification (Base cat. low qual.) -1.051*** -0.765*** 
 
-0.0844 
 
(0.0643) (0.0757) 
 
(0.116) 
Median level qualification -0.527*** -0.371*** 
 
-0.0463 
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  Probit Heck probit Selection equation Probit 
VARIABLES 
Over education 
(1) 
Over education  
(2)  
Employed 
(3) 
Migration 
(4) 
 
(0.0517) (0.0497) 
 
(0.102) 
Agriculture (Base cat. Services) 0.513*** 0.359*** 
 
-0.528* 
 
(0.117) (0.0916) 
 
(0.297) 
Industry sector 0.155*** 0.122*** 
 
-0.204** 
 
(0.0504) (0.0376) 
 
(0.0991) 
Construction sector -0.247*** -0.159** 
 
-0.110 
 
(0.0808) (0.0626) 
 
(0.153) 
Commercial sector 0.564*** 0.402*** 
 
0.0655 
 
(0.0416) (0.0478) 
 
(0.0791) 
Fixed term contract -0.245*** -0.185*** 
 
-0.0530 
 
(0.0376) (0.0309) 
 
(0.0686) 
Medium firms (15-100) 0.0113 0.00924 
 
0.216*** 
 
(0.0420) (0.0303) 
 
(0.0728) 
Large firms (over 100) 0.0175 0.0115 
 
0.212*** 
 
(0.0443) (0.0323) 
 
(0.0746) 
N. of component= 2 
  
-0.168*** -0.347*** 
   
(0.0397) (0.126) 
N. of component= 3 
  
-0.0174 0.0110 
   
(0.0372) (0.180) 
N. of component> 3 
  
-0.00761 0.0513 
   
(0.0373) (0.182) 
Housing arrangement: Rent 
   
0.385*** 
    
(0.0841) 
Housing arrangement: Young Adult Living 
   
-0.631*** 
    
(0.166) 
Provincial fixed effect Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.303 -1.066*** -1.023*** -1.097* 
 
(0.390) (0.321) (0.196) (0.591) 
Observations 7,220 22,796 22,796 6,553 
Smith-Blundell test of exogeneity of migration:  2.707659  Chi-sqr( 1)  P-value =  .0999 
Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have tested the hypothesis that in Italy the use of the informal recruitment 
channel (family and friends referrals) increases overeducation both directly and indirectly by 
reducing migration. We have found robust results for the direct positive effect of the 
informal channel on overeducation both when including all firms and when focussing on 
employment in the private sector. This result confirms the finding of Meliciani and 
Radicchia (2011) and suggests that, while, in principle, social ties can be an effective 
mechanism to overcome information asymmetries thus allowing for a better matching 
between employers and employees, in the Italian case they do not perform this virtuous role. 
This is in line with the model of Bentolila et al. (2004) where social contacts induce some 
workers to undertake careers in industries, professions, or firms where their comparative 
productive advantage is not fully exploited.  
 
A second important result of this paper is that individuals entering the labour market through 
the informal channel are less likely to migrate to find a job. This is not surprising 
considering that social ties tend to be geographically concentrated. However, the negative 
impact of social ties on migration can be a second source of mismatch to the extent that 
migration reduces overeducation. Previous studies investigating the relationship between 
migration and overeducation in Italy have found ambiguous results. In fact, while Croce and 
Ghignoni (2011) find that migration reduces overeducation, Devillanova (2013) argues that 
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the result is not robust to the inclusion of occupational variables in the overeducation 
equation and to controlling for the endogeneity of the migration choice. Finally, Iammarino 
and Marinelli (2012) show that among graduates only migration directed towards the 
Northern part of Italy reduces overeducation. The third aim of this paper has been to shed 
further light on the relationship between migration and overeducation by distinguishing 
between total employment and employment in the private sector and by focussing on 
different areas of the Italian territory separating inter-area and intra-area migration. Our 
empirical results show that, when focussing only on the private sector, only migration within 
the North-West reduces overeducation while when we include both the public and the 
private sector also migration within the South has a negative impact on overeducation. 
Surprisingly we do not find evidence of a negative impact of migration from the South to the 
North on overeducation. This might signal the fact that migrants from the South move in 
order to find any occupation rather than to find the job corresponding to the competencies 
acquired during their study.  
 
To the extent that spatial flexibility helps creating a better matching between employers and 
employees, the use of the informal recruitment channel by reducing migration may also 
contribute indirectly to increase overeducation. The existence of such an effect has 
important consequences on the design of effective policies devoted to reduce skill 
imbalances, suggesting that this outcome may be achieved not only by improving vocational 
education and training systems but also by better organising employment services with the 
purpose of enhancing spatial flexibility.  
 
In Italy, only few workers find a job through public and private employment agencies and 
our econometric estimates show that these channels do not perform better than the informal 
channel in favouring job-education matches and in enhancing spatial flexibility. On the 
contrary, individuals entering the labour market through schools, professional ties, reading 
of newspapers, direct applications and public competitions find jobs more in line with their 
levels of education and have a higher mobility with respect to individuals using the informal 
channel. An effective reform of employment services should, therefore, make these services 
at least as effective as more costly job search methods in order to avoid that workers remain 
“trapped” into occupations where their competences are not exploited. The results of our 
paper show that the reform of Italian employment services is crucial not only for reducing 
unemployment but also for enhancing human capital investment, bringing better 
competencies into the labour market and increasing job satisfaction and labour productivity. 
 
Finally, although this paper has mainly focussed on the characteristics of labour supply, we 
are aware that the structure of labour demand plays a crucial role in contributing to 
overeducation in a country characterised by a diffused presence of family managed small 
and medium enterprises. Therefore, in the lack of industrial policies encouraging models of 
production and type of activities more in tune with the vocational educational skills that are 
present in the country, it is unlikely that the paradoxical phenomenon of overeducation in a 
country that relatively under-invests in high education will be effectively tackled.    
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Appendix 
Employees with a level of education higher than the 
compulsory school  
Informal channel Formal channel Migration No migration Overeducation No overeducation 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Informal channel 13097 0.236 0.425   
 
    0.284 0.451 0.374 0.484 0.332 0.471 0.180 0.384 
Overducation 13097 0.369 0.483 0.519 0.500 0.323 0.468 0.152 0.359 0.241 0.428   
 
    
Spatial flexibility 13097 0.055 0.227 0.035 0.184 0.061 0.239   
 
    0.042 0.201 0.062 0.241 
Commuting time 11318 19.965 19.510 18.598 18.116 20.395 19.908 24.775 22.662 19.692 19.280 17.351 16.153 21.406 20.995 
Foreigner 28669 0.012 0.109 0.023 0.150 0.010 0.099 0.018 0.132 0.013 0.112 0.025 0.156 0.006 0.077 
Woman 28669 0.499 0.500 0.445 0.497 0.463 0.499 0.384 0.486 0.463 0.499 0.393 0.488 0.497 0.500 
Sons 28669 0.489 0.500 0.459 0.498 0.571 0.495 0.589 0.492 0.542 0.498 0.492 0.500 0.575 0.494 
Woman*sons 28669 0.266 0.442 0.237 0.425 0.290 0.454 0.238 0.426 0.280 0.449 0.217 0.412 0.313 0.464 
Type secondary (Liceo) 28564 0.318 0.466 0.217 0.412 0.310 0.463 0.349 0.477 0.285 0.451 0.255 0.436 0.308 0.462 
University 28669 0.250 0.433 0.148 0.356 0.313 0.464 0.383 0.486 0.268 0.443 0.135 0.342 0.355 0.479 
Failed 28669 0.163 0.370 0.197 0.398 0.163 0.369 0.162 0.368 0.172 0.377 0.219 0.414 0.143 0.350 
Metropolitan City 28669 0.091 0.287 0.081 0.272 0.098 0.297 0.099 0.298 0.093 0.291 0.091 0.288 0.095 0.293 
North West 28669 0.270 0.444 0.289 0.453 0.293 0.455 0.259 0.438 0.294 0.456 0.285 0.451 0.296 0.457 
North  East 28669 0.202 0.402 0.216 0.412 0.224 0.417 0.210 0.407 0.223 0.416 0.231 0.421 0.217 0.412 
Centre 28669 0.203 0.402 0.220 0.414 0.207 0.406 0.202 0.402 0.211 0.408 0.226 0.418 0.201 0.401 
South 28669 0.326 0.469 0.275 0.446 0.275 0.447 0.329 0.470 0.272 0.445 0.259 0.438 0.285 0.451 
Single 28669 0.445 0.497 0.467 0.499 0.355 0.479 0.330 0.470 0.385 0.487 0.449 0.497 0.343 0.475 
Divorced 28669 0.036 0.186 0.034 0.182 0.044 0.205 0.040 0.195 0.042 0.201 0.042 0.200 0.042 0.200 
Widower 28669 0.014 0.119 0.009 0.094 0.013 0.115 0.011 0.102 0.012 0.110 0.010 0.100 0.014 0.116 
Age 18-29 28669 0.259 0.438 0.232 0.422 0.137 0.344 0.115 0.319 0.162 0.369 0.212 0.409 0.130 0.336 
Age 30-39 28669 0.284 0.451 0.336 0.472 0.304 0.460 0.333 0.471 0.310 0.462 0.350 0.477 0.289 0.453 
Age 40-49 28669 0.236 0.425 0.276 0.447 0.308 0.462 0.297 0.457 0.301 0.459 0.268 0.443 0.319 0.466 
Age over 49 28669 0.221 0.415 0.156 0.363 0.251 0.434 0.255 0.436 0.227 0.419 0.171 0.376 0.263 0.440 
Skills (languages and pc) 28669 0.959 0.198 0.956 0.205 0.964 0.186 0.972 0.164 0.962 0.192 0.946 0.227 0.972 0.165 
Training course 28669 0.277 0.448 0.232 0.422 0.350 0.477 0.441 0.497 0.315 0.465 0.209 0.406 0.388 0.487 
High level qualification  12958 0.304 0.460 0.173 0.378 0.344 0.475 0.387 0.487 0.299 0.458 0.159 0.366 0.388 0.487 
Median level qualification 12958 0.543 0.498 0.589  0.492 0.529 0.499 0.508 0.500 0.545 0.498 0.560 0.496 0.533 0.499 
25 
 
Employees with a level of education higher than the 
compulsory school  
Informal channel Formal channel Migration No migration Overeducation No overeducation 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Low level qualification 12958 0.153 0.360 0.238 0.426 0.127 0.332 0.105 0.306 0.156 0.363 0.281 0.449 0.078 0.269 
Agriculture 13097 0.025 0.157 0.032 0.176 0.023 0.151 0.013 0.112 0.026 0.159 0.042 0.200 0.016 0.124 
Industry sector 13097 0.134 0.340 0.179 0.383 0.120 0.325 0.081 0.272 0.137 0.344 0.184 0.387 0.105 0.306 
Construction sector 13097 0.049 0.216 0.066 0.247 0.044 0.205 0.030 0.172 0.050 0.218 0.042 0.201 0.053 0.224 
Commercial sector 13097 0.146 0.354 0.207 0.405 0.128 0.334 0.078 0.268 0.150 0.357 0.239 0.427 0.092 0.289 
Services sector 13097 0.646 0.478 0.517 0.500 0.685 0.464 0.799 0.401 0.637 0.481 0.493 0.500 0.735 0.442 
Fixed term contract 13097 0.640 0.480 0.616 0.486 0.648 0.478 0.747 0.435 0.634 0.482 0.584 0.493 0.673 0.469 
Small firms (less 15) 13097 0.388 0.487 0.546 0.498 0.339 0.473 0.198 0.399 0.399 0.490 0.466 0.499 0.341 0.474 
Medium firms (15-100) 13097 0.153 0.360 0.218 0.413 0.133 0.339 0.131 0.338 0.154 0.361 0.195 0.396 0.128 0.335 
Large firms (over 100) 13097 0.460 0.498 0.236 0.425 0.529 0.499 0.670 0.470 0.447 0.497 0.339 0.473 0.530 0.499 
Source: ISFOL-PLUS 2011 
 
